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Abstract 
 Across four studies we demonstrate that effects obtained from the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP), like those obtained from other indirect procedures, are not 
impervious to strategic manipulation. In Experiment 1, we found that merely informing 
participants to ‘fake’ their performance without providing a concrete strategy to do so did not 
eliminate, reverse, or in any way alter the obtained outcomes. However, when those same 
instructions orientated attention towards the core parameters of the task, participants 
spontaneously derived a strategy that allowed them to eliminate their effects (Experiment 2). 
When participants were provided with a viable response strategy they successfully reversed the 
direction of their overall IRAP effect (Experiment 3). By refining the nature of those instructions 
we managed to target and alter individual trial-type effects in isolation with some success 
(Experiment 4).  
Keywords: IRAP, Faking, Race, Sexual, Attitudes, Disgust 
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Faking Revisited: Exerting Strategic Control over Performance on the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure 
Self-report questionnaires constitute some of the most widely-used and versatile tools in 
the modern psychologist’s armamentarium. Researchers from nearly every corner of the 
discipline draw upon these “direct” procedures in order to capture people’s verbally-reported 
thoughts, feelings, and actions. However, if these tasks are to provide a valid index of the 
psychological phenomenon of interest then two basic pre-conditions must be met. First, people 
need to possess reliable introspective access to the behavior under investigation. Second, the 
outcomes obtained from those procedures should not be contaminated by strategic attempts to 
manipulate task performance. Unfortunately it appears that these two conditions are frequently 
violated – especially in socially sensitive domains. The fallibility of introspection coupled with 
the capacity to strategically distort task performance spurred the development of a new class of 
“indirect” procedures that many hoped would circumvent these methodological shortcomings. 
Examples include the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), 
Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) as well as 
semantic and evaluative priming (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). These procedures are 
assumed to reduce one’s ability to exert control over their behavior and to capture thoughts and 
feelings under the various conditions of automaticity (see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).  
 Over the past decade, however, researchers have begun to question the above 
assumptions. Although indirect procedures are certainly less sensitive to self-presentational 
biases compared to their direct counterparts they are far from immune to strategic manipulation 
or “faking”. For example, making the IAT’s procedural parameters apparent to the participant by 
providing them with simple or detailed instructions (Cvencek, Greenwald, Brown, Gray, & 
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Snowdon, 2010; Kim, 2003), prior experience (Steffens, 2004), or some combination of the two 
(Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005) increases their ability to exert control over the direction and 
magnitude of the IAT effect (Röhner, Schröder-Abé, & Schütz, 2011). Similar findings have also 
been obtained for variants of the IAT (Stieger, Göritz, Hergovich, & Voracek, 2011; Verschuere, 
Prati, & De Houwer, 2009) as well as other indirect procedures, such as evaluative priming 
(Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2013), the AMP (Teige-Mocigemba, Penzl, Becker, Henn, & 
Klauer, 2015) and the Approach-Avoidance Task (AAT; Langer et al., 2010). Although 
researchers have recommended statistical indices to detect and correct for faking attempts 
(Agosta, Ghirardi, Zogmaister, Castiello, & Sartori, 2011; Cvencek et al., 2010) these algorithms 
are only partially successful, and have yet to be applied to other indirect procedures (Röhner, 
Schröder-Abé, & Schütz, 2013). Given the susceptibility of the IAT and priming to strategic 
manipulation, it seems important to determine if other indirect procedures are also sensitive to 
those same factors. If so, then initial assumptions about this class of measures need to be revised 
and greater steps taken to protect against self-presentation and impression management. If not, 
and a subset of indirect procedures are relatively more impervious to the aforementioned 
influences, then they could be deployed in domains where social-desirability concerns are 
especially problematic.  
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
Our goal in the current paper is to examine whether the outcomes obtained from an 
indirect procedure known as the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-
Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Bowles, & Stewart, 2010) are also susceptible to strategic 
manipulation. The IRAP sets out to examine the speed and accuracy with which people 
automatically relate rather than simply categorize stimuli. To illustrate, imagine that you are 
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interested in implicit self-esteem and decide to administer an IAT to a group of depressed and 
non-depressed participants. During a first test phase, participants categorize self-related items 
(e.g., their name) and positive words (e.g., HAPPY) using one response key and other-related 
items (e.g., another person’s name) and negative words (e.g., INCOMPETENT) using a second 
response key. During another test phase, response mappings are reversed so that self-related 
items and negative words are assigned to the first key whereas other-related items and positive 
words are assigned to the second key. The difference in how well someone performs during the 
first relative to the second phase is considered to provide an overall measure of how readily they 
categorize self-related words with positive or negatively valenced adjectives. Critically, 
however, such an effect does not reveal how a person relates those concepts. For non-depressed 
individuals, it may be that the IAT effect reflects the extent to which they believe that they are 
good (actual self-esteem) whereas for their depressed counterparts the same score reflects how 
much they want to be good (ideal self-esteem). An indirect procedure that merely categorizes 
different classes of stimuli would not be able to distinguish between these two beliefs and instead 
would show evidence for positive self-evaluations in both cases (e.g., De Raedt, Schacht, Franck, 
& De Houwer, 2006).  
In contrast, the IRAP allows one to capture beliefs that are emitted under the various 
conditions of automaticity. During each trial, the computer presents a label stimulus at the top of 
the screen (e.g., “I am” versus “I am not” ), a target stimulus in the middle of the screen (e.g., a 
positive or negative adjective) and two response options at the bottom of the screen (e.g., “True” 
and “False”). By presenting speciﬁc combinations of label and target stimuli together, and by 
requiring a certain response to be emitted quickly and accurately, the task repeatedly exposes 
participants to four different types of trials (e.g., I Am-Good; I Am-Bad; I Am Not-Good; I Am 
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Not-Bad ). These trials are grouped together into blocks. During one type of block participants 
are required to endorse the beliefs “I am-Good” and “I am not-Bad” while rejecting the beliefs “I 
am-Bad” and “I am not-Good”. During a second type of block participants are required to do 
precisely the opposite, endorsing the latter beliefs (“I am-Bad” and “I am not-Good”) while 
rejecting the former (“I am-Good” and “I am not-Bad”). The difference in time taken to respond 
to stimuli during these different blocks of trials – deﬁned as the IRAP effect – indicates the 
strength or probability with which those stimuli are related. Although data from all trials can be 
combined to create an overall IRAP effect - indicating how quickly people tend to endorse one 
set of beliefs relative to another - most researchers tend to compute a separate IRAP effect for 
each of the four trial-types (see Barnes-Holmes et al. 2010). This enables them to independently 
examine, and subsequently compare, the speed and accuracy with which people endorse different 
beliefs, such as I Am-Good, I Am-Bad, I Am not-Good and I Am not-Bad (for more on the IRAP 
and its relationship to other indirect procedures see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2015; Nosek, 
Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011)
1
. 
At the time of writing, there were forty-one empirical publications about the IRAP 
distributed across fourteen peer-review journals (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013 for a 
review of this work). Several points are worth noting at this juncture. First, the IRAP is similar to 
other indirect procedures insofar as it captures behaviors that are not typically accounted for by 
                                               
1
 Note that a procedure is often described as being “direct” whenever participants are asked to self-assess the to-be-
measured construct (e.g., confirm or reject a specific belief or attitude) and “indirect” whenever the construct is 
assessed indirectly on the basis of other behaviour (e.g., when the attitude or belief is inferred from reaction time 
performance in a speeded categorization task) (De Houwer, 2006). From this perspective the IRAP is relatively 
more direct than other tasks such as the IAT or AMP (given that participants are required to endorse or reject the 
relation between different stimuli). Yet the belief or attitude is still inferred indirectly by assessing its effect on task 
performance. In other words, it is not the participants’ expressed attitudes or beliefs that are measured, but rather 
their average response latencies to tasks that require them to endorse or reject a relevant belief. Therefore it seems 
that, just like automaticity, the directness/indirectness of a procedure is not an “all-or-nothing” property. Rather 
procedures can be arranged along a continuum from relatively more indirect to relatively more direct depending on 
their specific properties. It seems that tasks like the IAT fall closer to the indirect end of the continuum, traditional 
self-report questionnaires fall closer to the direct end, and the IRAP falls somewhere in between (for a more detailed 
treatment of this topic see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). 
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self-report methodologies, especially in socially-sensitive domains (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, 
Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010; Roddy, Stewart, & Barnes‐Holmes, 2011). Second, 
the behaviors captured by the IRAP often predict future behaviors and differentiate between 
groups in ways that self-reports do not. For instance, a recent meta-analysis of the predictive 
validity of IRAP effects found that it predicts similar outcomes to that of the IAT, and that both 
measures did so in ways that alluded self-report procedures (Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2015).  
Third, it is worth repeating that unlike virtually all other indirect procedures, the IRAP 
was designed to capture the extent to which stimuli are automatically related rather than simply 
categorized with one another. Although the speed and accuracy with which these relational 
responses are emitted could be explained by many different mental models, they are consistent 
with the idea that once propositional beliefs are acquired they can be activated automatically. 
Although many researchers take the position that human cognition is carved into two 
conceptually distinct mental systems (i.e., associative linking vs. propositional reasoning) that 
function under different operating conditions (i.e., automatic vs. controlled) (e.g., Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2011), findings from the IRAP and other recently developed indirect procedures 
(e.g., De Houwer, Heider, Spruyt, Roets, & Hughes, 2015) offer another possibility: that humans 
can automatically relate stimuli in a wide number of ways and that the manner in which stimuli 
are related matters. Indeed, several researchers have found that relating the same stimuli in 
different ways (e.g., “I am good” vs. “I want to be good”; “I want unhealthy foods” vs. 
“Unhealthy foods make me hungry”) can lead to very different outcomes on the IRAP – 
outcomes that are often absent from self-report procedures, which predict future behavior, and 
differentiate between known groups (e.g., Carpenter, Martinez, Vadhan, Barnes-Holmes, & 
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Nunes, 2012; McKenna, Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, Yoder, & O’Shea, in press; Remue, Hughes, 
De Houwer, & De Raedt, 2014; Rönspies et al., 2015). In this sense the IRAP effect may 
represent one measure of implicit propositional knowledge (i.e., it captures the activation of 
propositions concerning how stimuli are related to one another under certain conditions of 
automaticity) (for a more detailed treatment of this topic see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De 
Houwer, 2011; De Houwer, 2014; De Houwer et al., 2015)
2
.  
Faking the IRAP 
Despite its growing popularity in social (Drake et al., 2015), cognitive (Remue et al., 
2014) and clinical psychology (McKenna et al., in press), only a single published study has 
examined whether participants can strategically modify their performance on this task 
(McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2007). In their study, McKenna and 
colleagues exposed participants to a baseline IRAP in order to assess their automatic evaluations 
of pleasant and unpleasant words. Thereafter participants were divided into three groups and 
administered instructions that either: (a) described a strategy for reversing their previous IRAP 
effect, (b) asked participants to reverse their effect but provided no information on how to do so, 
or (c) provided an overview of the task (control). When participants repeated the IRAP for a 
second time the authors found that none of the above instructions reversed, or even attenuated 
effects.  
                                               
2
 As we mentioned above, automatic (or implicit) is not an all-or-nothing concept but rather an umbrella term for a 
collection of operating conditions under which an assumed mental process operates (De Houwer et al., 2009). For 
instance, a measure may be implicit in the sense that the outcome is obtained even when participants have to 
respond quickly, without intention, awareness, or control. Different measures (IAT, AMP) can therefore vary in the 
extent to which they qualify as implicit (e.g., some may require speed and intention, while others are based on a lack 
of awareness or control). Although no systematic program of research has sought to determine to what extent the 
IRAP is implicit along each of these dimension, several studies show that it is implicit in the sense of being highly 
dependent on speeded performance (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010), and that 
effects emerge in the absence of control (e.g., Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2009; Carpenter et 
al., 2012). The extent to which IRAP effects also depend on intention and awareness are topics worthy of 
consideration. 
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While these findings are certainly encouraging, and support the notion that the IRAP is a 
procedure that is not readily amenable to faking, they were obtained with a relatively small 
sample, in a single, non-socially sensitive domain, where motivation to strategically modify 
one’s performance was likely low. It is also important to note that the IRAP itself has undergone 
many changes over the past decade and that more recent iterations of the task significantly differ 
from those used by McKenna and colleagues in their faking study (see Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013). It therefore seems prudent to re-evaluate their claims about the IRAPs resistance 
to faking with a version of the task that is currently used today.  
Overview of the Current Research 
In what follows we report a series of experiments that investigated whether instructions 
to reverse the direction and magnitude of IRAP effects would enable participants to manipulate 
how they respond towards members of other racial groups and sexual orientations, as well as 
towards clinically (disgust), and socially relevant (pleasant/unpleasant) stimuli. In each study, 
participants were exposed to a baseline IRAP, followed by a set of faking or control instructions. 
Thereafter they were administered the task again so that the impact of these instructions could be 
ascertained. We systematically varied the nature of the instructions across studies, from basic 
requests to alter task performance in the absence of a recommended strategy (Experiment 1), to 
those that allowed participants to derive such a strategy for themselves (Experiment 2). We also 
provided detailed instructions on how to reverse effects on all four IRAP trial-types (Experiment 
3) or how to reverse a single trial-type effect while leaving the other three untouched 
(Experiment 4). By adopting this approach, we sought to determine what level of instructions (if 
any) are necessary to successfully eliminate or reverse IRAP effects.  
EXPERIMENT 1 
 IRAP FAKING 10 
Experiment 1 sought to replicate the findings of McKenna et al. (2007). In particular, we 
were interested in whether participants could strategically alter their automatic evaluations of 
pleasant and unpleasant words in the absence of a recommended strategy for doing so.  
 Method 
Participants                                                                                                                                          
 Sixty students at Ghent University (45 women), ranging in age from 18 to 59 years (M = 
23.2, SD = 5.9) completed the study in exchange for €5 or course credit. Allocation to the faking 
and control conditions was counterbalanced across participants. Students reported that they had 
either complete no, or a single, IRAP prior to the study.  
Materials 
IRAP stimuli. Six positively (happy, friendship, joy, peace, love, pleasure) and six 
negatively valenced items (Hitler, pedophile, cancer, incest, murder, suicide) served as label 
stimuli during the IRAP (positive: M = 6.42, SD = 0.76; negative: M = 1.24, SD = 0.46). These 
items were selected from a large pool of Dutch words whose valence had previously been 
normed using a scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive) (Moors et al., 2013). Six 
positive (good, pleasant, fun, positive, fantastic, excellent) and six negative adjectives (bad, 
unpleasant, nasty, negative, horrible, terrible) were used as target stimuli while ‘Same’ and 
‘Opposite’ served as the two response options.  
Procedure   
Upon arriving at the laboratory participants were welcomed by the researcher, seated in 
front of a computer, and provided with a brief description of the procedures they would 
subsequently encounter. Once they had provided their informed consent, they were exposed to a 
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pre-instructions IRAP, a set of control or faking instructions, followed by a post-instructions 
IRAP. A similar experimental sequence was adopted in Experiments 1-4.  
         Pre-Instructions IRAP. The IRAP consisted of a minimum of one and a maximum of 
three pairs of practice blocks followed by a fixed set of three pairs of test blocks. Each block 
consisted of twenty four trials that presented either a positive or negative label stimulus at the top 
of the screen, a positive or negative target stimulus in the middle of the screen and two relational 
response options (‘Same’ or ‘Opposite’) at the bottom of the screen. In this way the IRAP was 
comprised of four different trial-types: Positive-Positive; Negative-Negative, Positive-Negative 
and Negative-Positive (see Figure 1). The presentation of trials was varied in a quasi-random 
order such that each trial-type appeared an equal number of times within every block. The 
allocation of the two response options to the left or right side of the screen was fixed across 
successive trials. 
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Figure 1. Examples of the four IRAP trial-types used in Experiment 1. A valenced label stimulus appeared at the top 
of the screen (e.g., ‘Friendship’ or ‘Murder’), along with a valenced target stimulus in the middle of the screen (e.g., 
‘Pleasant’ or ‘Terrible’) and two relational response options (‘Same’ and ‘Opposite’) at the bottom of the screen. 
 
  Prior to the task participants were informed that a number of words would appear 
onscreen and that they would have to relate those words based on one of two responses rules: 
either Rule A (“Please act as if good words are good and bad words are bad”) or Rule B 
(“Please act as if good words are bad and bad words are good”). Participants were required to 
respond in a manner that was consistent with the response rule that applied to that given block of 
trials. These two rules for responding were alternated across successive blocks, resulting in three 
pairs of IRAP test blocks (Block 1-Rule A; Block 2-Rule B; Block 3-Rule A; Block 4-Rule B; 
Block 5-Rule A; Block 6-Rule B). 
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The IRAP commenced with a pair of practice blocks. Participants progressed from the 
practice to the test blocks whenever they responded with a pre-defined accuracy (at least 80% 
accuracy) and speed (median latency of less than 2000ms) on a successive pair of practice 
blocks. Failure to meet these criteria resulted in re-exposure to another pair of practice blocks 
until participants either achieved those criteria or a maximum of three pairs of practice blocks 
were completed. If the above criteria were met then a fixed set of three test block pairs were 
administered. If not, then participants were thanked, debriefed and dismissed.  
         Faking instructions. Following the first IRAP a set of instructions appeared onscreen, 
the content of which differed for those in the control and faking conditions. Participants in the 
faking condition were informed that they would complete a similar task as before, but this time 
their goal was to “strategically alter their performance in such a way that ‘fooled’ or ‘tricked’ 
the computer into thinking that you considered good words to be bad and bad words to be good. 
That is, you should respond in a way that would lead the researcher to think that you find words 
like ‘murder’ and ‘incest’ to be good and other words such as ‘love’ and ‘peace’ to be bad.” 
These instructions also emphasized that participants would still need to meet speed and accuracy 
criteria during each block of trials. The researcher then checked that the participants understood 
the above instructions and provided corrective feedback where necessary.  
Participants in the control condition were also provided with instructions that were 
matched in length but which differed in content. These instructions provided background 
information about the procedure and suggested that they would need to complete the task once 
more so that its test-retest reliability could be ascertained. Any questions were subsequently 
addressed by the researcher, after which, the post-instructions IRAP was initiated. This second 
IRAP was identical in all respects to the baseline measure. 
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Results                                                                                                     
Analytic Strategy 
 To determine whether IRAP performance differed as a function of instructions received 
(independent variable), a series of repeated measures ANOVAs and post-hoc tests were carried 
out on the data from the IRAP’s four trial-types (dependent variable).  
Data Preparation 
Participant exclusion. Two participants failed to meet the accuracy and latency criteria 
during both the pre- and post-instructions IRAPs. Another participant failed the pre-instructions 
IRAP while five failed the post-instructions IRAP. The data from these eight individuals were 
removed prior to analysis
3
.  
IRAP scoring. The primary datum obtained from the IRAP was response latency, 
defined as the time in milliseconds (ms) that elapsed from the onset of each IRAP trial to the first 
correct response emitted by the participant. To minimize contamination by individual differences 
associated with age, motor skills, and/or cognitive ability, response latency data were 
transformed into difference (D) scores using an adaptation of Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji’s 
(2003) D algorithm (see Appendix C for a detailed overview of the steps involved in calculating 
D-IRAP scores). Four D scores were calculated for each participant, one for each of the trial-types 
that comprised the task (i.e., Positive-Positive; Negative-Negative; Positive-Negative; Negative-
Positive). Positive scores indicated that participants were quicker to endorse the belief that 
positive stimuli were positive and reject the belief that they were negative. Negative scores 
indicated that participants were quicker to endorse the belief that negative stimuli were negative 
                                               
3
 In-line with previous work (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012) whenever participants failed to maintain accuracy 
criterion on one of the six test blocks all the data from that test block pair was excluded and analyses conducted on 
the remaining two test block pairs. In Experiment 1 this was the case for six participants in the faking condition and 
eight participants in the control condition.  
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and reject the belief that they were positive. Neutral scores indicated the absence of either 
response bias. Finally, we calculated a change score for each of the four trial-types by 
subtracting pre- from post-instructions D scores. This allowed us to examine whether task 
performance varied from one IRAP to the other. Positive change scores indicate an increase in 
the magnitude of IRAP effects across test sessions while negative scores indicate the opposite.  
Hypothesis Testing 
 Pre- and Post-Instruction IRAPs. We expected participants to automatically endorse 
the belief that positive stimuli are positive and reject the belief that positive stimuli are negative 
(i.e., produce a positive effect on the Positive-Positive and Positive-Negative trial-types). We 
also expected participants to endorse the belief that negative stimuli are negative and reject the 
belief that negative stimuli are positive (i.e., produce a negative effect on the Negative-Negative 
and Negative-Positive trial-types).  
 Submitting D scores to a 2 (Instruction Type: faking vs. control) x 2 (Test Time: pre vs. 
post instructions IRAP) x 4 (Trial-Type) mixed-models ANOVA revealed a main effect for 
Trial-Type, F(3, 50) = 31.44, p < .001, η2partial = .39, as well as a two-way interaction between 
Trial-Type and Time, F(3, 50) = 9.15, p < .001, η2partial = .16 (no main or interaction effects 
emerged for Instruction Type). During the pre-instructions IRAP, participants showed the 
expected effect on all four trial-types, with follow-up, one-sample t-tests indicating that these 
effects significantly differed from zero (ps < .002), with the exception of the Negative-Negative 
trial-type, t(51) = 1.25, p = .22. During the post-instructions IRAP, participants continued to 
endorse the belief that positive words were positive (Positive-Positive), t(51) = 7.48, p < .001, 
and reject the belief that positive words were negative (Positive-Negative) trial-types, t(51) = 
2.77, p < .01. However, there was no evidence for an effect on either the Negative-Positive (p = 
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.49) or Negative-Negative trial-types (p = .57) indicating that certain IRAP effects diminished in 
magnitude across repeated test administrations (see Table 1). 
Change from Pre- to Post-Instruction IRAP. Submitting change scores to a 2 
(Instruction Type) x 4 (Trial-Type) repeated measures ANOVA revealed that trial-type effects 
for those in the faking and control conditions did not differ significantly across the two test 
sessions (all ps > .3). When data from all participants was considered, effects on the Positive-
Positive, t(51) = 3.03, p = .004, and Negative-Positive trial-types, t(51) = 3.54, p = .001, were 
found to significantly attenuate from one test session to the next. 
IRAP Reliability 
To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, four split-half reliability scores were 
calculated, one for each of the four trial-types. These scores was generated by applying the D 
algorithm separately to odd and even numbered trials. With respect to the pre-instruction IRAP, 
split-half correlations between odd and even scores, applying Spearman-Brown corrections, were 
as follows: Positive-Positive, r = .40, Positive-Negative, r = .24, Negative-Positive, r = .34, and 
Negative-Negative, r = .58. Internal consistency of the post-instructions IRAP was as follows: 
Positive-Positive, r = .34, Positive-Negative, r = .47, Negative-Positive, r = .19, and Negative-
Negative, r = .39.  
Discussion 
In-line with McKenna et al. (2007) we found that instructing participants to fake their 
evaluations of positive and negative adjectives – without providing a viable strategy to do so – 
did not eliminate or reverse their IRAP effects. During the pre-instructions IRAP participants 
responded in-line with our expectations – automatically endorsing the belief that positive words 
were positive and that negative words were negative while simultaneously rejecting the belief 
 IRAP FAKING 17 
that negative words were positive. During the post-instructions IRAP participants continued to 
respond as they had before. However, the magnitude of their effects diminished across repeated 
measurement, such that they continued to produce significant effects on the Positive-Positive and 
Positive-Negative trial-types but showed no evidence for effects on the Negative-Negative or 
Negative-Positive trial-types. There was no evidence to suggest that these attenuated effects were 
due to the type of instructions participants received.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
Only two studies have explored the fakeability of the IRAP (Experiment 1 and McKenna 
et al., 2007) and both have relied on a similar set of (generic) valenced stimuli. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2, we sought to rule out the possibility that the IRAP’s insensitivity to manipulation 
was due to the specific stimuli employed or the domain tested. We set evaluations of generic 
stimuli to the side and instead focused our attention on a clinically-relevant domain (disgust) 
which has previously been shown to produce robust IRAP effects (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 
2012). At the same time we also modified the faking instructions so that they now orientated 
participants towards those task parameters that would allow them to derive a viable response 
strategy for themselves.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty students at Ghent University (43 women), ranging in age from 18 to 47 years (M = 
22.7, SD = 5.3) completed the study in exchange for €5 or course credit. The order of IRAP test 
blocks as well as assignment of participants to the faking or control conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants. Students reported that they had completed either no, or a 
single, IRAP prior to the study.                                  
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Measures 
IRAP stimuli. The task was identical to that used in Experiment 1 with the exception of 
the stimuli employed. There were a total of twelve label stimuli; six of which involved a negative 
appraisal of a target (‘I find it horrible’, ‘I think it is disgusting’, ‘It looks nasty’, ‘I feel revolted’, 
‘It makes me sick’, and ‘I am repulsed’) and six which involved a positive appraisal of a target 
(‘I think it’s pleasant’, ‘I find it nice’, ‘It’s good’, ‘It makes me feel happy’, ‘It look’s nice’, ‘It 
makes me feel great’). Six color photographs of items designed to evoke disgust (rotten meat, a 
large maggot, bloody hand, diseased mouth cavity, toilet with feces, burnt face) and six pleasant 
images (baby, puppies, nature scenes, kittens, bunnies) were selected variously from the Internet 
and from the International Affective Picture System (IAPs: Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) to 
serve as target stimuli. Participants rated the six disgusting items (M = 2.02, SD = 1.09) and six 
non-disgusting items (M = 6.57, SD = .83) using a scale ranging from 1 (disgusting) to 7 (not 
disgusting) with 4 as a neutral point. The words ‘True’ and ‘False’ served as two response 
options while the rules for responding were Rule A (“Please answer AS IF disgusting things are 
disgusting”) and Rule B (“Please answer AS IF disgusting things are pleasant”). This led to the 
following four trial-types: Pleasant-Positive, Pleasant-Negative, Disgusting-Positive, 
Disgusting-Negative. Finally, the response options were varied in a quasi-random order within 
each block. 
 Procedure 
Faking Instructions. Similar to Study 1 participants were allocated to either a control or 
faking instruction condition. This time however, the faking condition was provided with a more 
elaborate set of instructions that orientated attention towards those properties of the procedure 
(i.e., speeded responding) that would facilitate strategic manipulation of task performance. 
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Specifically, participants were informed that “In the next part of the experiment you will have to 
try to trick the computer into thinking that you like disgusting things and dislike pleasant things. 
You should respond in a way that would lead the researcher to think that you find disgusting 
pictures to be pleasant and pleasant pictures to disgusting. I can’t provide specific instructions 
on how you can do this, but the only way to fake your performance is to figure out how the task 
works. Pay attention to how you respond during the task in order to figure out how you can fake 
it.” The researcher subsequently checked that participants understood the above instructions and 
provided corrective feedback where necessary.  
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 The analytic strategy adopted here was similar to that in Experiment 1.  
Data Preparation 
Participant exclusion. Four participants failed to meet the mastery criteria during both 
the pre- and post-instructions IRAPs. Another two failed the pre-instructions IRAP while seven 
failed the post-instructions IRAP. The data from these thirteen individuals was removed prior to 
analysis. Of the remaining participants nine in the faking condition and seven in the control 
condition failed to maintain accuracy criterion on one of the six test blocks. For these 
participants D scores were calculated based on the remaining two test block pairs. 
IRAP scoring. D scores for each of the four trial-types (Pleasant-Positive, Pleasant-
Negative, Disgusting-Positive, Disgusting-Negative) were calculated in a similar manner as 
Experiment 1. Positive scores indicated that participants were quicker to endorse the belief that 
stimuli were pleasant and reject the belief that they were disgusting. Negative scores indicated 
that participants were quicker to endorse the belief that stimuli were disgusting and reject the 
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belief that they were positive. Neutral scores indicated the absence of either response bias. 
Finally, change scores were also calculated as in Experiment 1. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Pre- and Post-Instruction IRAPs. Based on previous work (Nicholson & Barnes- 
Holmes, 2012) we expected participants to endorse the belief that pleasant images were positive 
and reject the belief that those same images were negative (i.e., produce positive effects on the 
Pleasant-Positive and Pleasant-Negative trial-types). We also expected them to endorse the 
belief that disgusting images were negative and reject the belief that those same images were 
positive (i.e., to produce negative effects on the Disgusting-Positive and Disgusting-Negative 
trial-types). Submitting D scores to a 4 (Trial-Type) x 2 (Test Time) x 2 (Instruction Type) 
mixed-models ANOVA revealed a main effect for Trial-Type, F(3, 45) = 27.21, p < .001, η2partial 
= .38, a two-way interaction between Trial-Type and Time, F(3, 45) = 11.37, p < .001, η2partial = 
.20, and a three-way interaction between Trial-Type, Time, and Instruction Type, F(3, 45) = 
10.29, p < .001, η2partial = .19. To qualify this three-way interaction we explored the impact of 
Time and Trial-Type separately for the faking and control conditions.  
With respect to the control group, analyses revealed a main effect of Trial-Type, F(3, 24) 
= 31.12, p < .001, η2partial = .57, but no main or interaction effects with Time. In other words, 
participants showed the expected effects on all four trial types during the pre-and post-
instructions IRAPs, with follow-up one-sample t-tests indicating that these effects differed 
significantly from zero (ps < .03) (with one exception: the Disgusting-Positive trial-type failed to 
reach significance during the post-instructions IRAP, t(24) = 0.46, p = .65). A very different 
picture emerged for those in the faking condition. Analyses revealed a main effect for Trial-
Type, F(3, 21) = 6.21, p = .001, η2partial = .23, as well as a two-way interaction between Trial-
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Type and Time, F(3, 21) = 13.61, p < .001, η2partial = .39. During the pre-instructions IRAP, 
participants showed the expected effect on all four trial-types, with follow-up t-tests indicating 
that these effects significantly differed from zero (ps < .001), with the exception of the 
Disgusting-Positive trial-type, t(21) = 1.47, p = .16. Yet during the post-instructions IRAP none 
of the effects differed significantly from zero with the exception of the Disgusting-Positive trial-
type, t(21) = 2.45, p = .02, which was now in precisely the opposite direction as before (see 
Table 2).   
 Change from Pre- to Post-Instruction IRAP. When changes scores were submitted to a 
2 (Instruction Type) x 4 (Trial-Type) repeated measures ANOVA a main effect emerged for 
Instruction Type, F(1, 45) = 14.29, p < .001, η2partial = .24. Participants in the control condition 
did not differ in how they responded on the Pleasant-Positive (M = .04, SD = .47), Pleasant-
Negative (M = -.06, SD = .43), Disgusting-Positive (M = .15, SD = .39) or Disgusting-Negative 
trial-types (M = .09, SD = .56) from one IRAP to the next (all ps > .07). In contrast, the 
magnitude of the Pleasant-Positive (M = -.51, SD = .69), t(21) = 3.44, p = .002, Pleasant-
Negative (M = -.46, SD = .52), t(21) = 4.14, p < .001, Disgusting-Positive (M = .46, SD = .67), 
t(21) = 3.23, p = .004, and Disgusting-Negative trial-types (M = .55, SD = .77), t(21) = 3.35, p = 
.003, significantly changed once participants received instructions to fake their performance.  
IRAP Reliability 
With respect to the pre-instruction IRAP, internal consistency for the four trial-types was 
as follows: Positive-Positive, r = .38, Positive-Negative, r = .44, Negative-Positive, r = .62, and 
Negative-Negative, r = .53. Internal consistency of the post-instructions IRAP was as follows: 
Positive-Positive, r = .72, Positive-Negative, r = .71, Negative-Positive, r = .51, and Negative-
Negative, r = .62.  
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Discussion 
  In Experiment 2 we measured implicit beliefs about disgusting and pleasant stimuli on 
two occasions. In between test administrations we provided half of the participants with simple 
faking instructions that orientated their attention towards those properties of the procedure that 
would enable them to manipulate their effects (the other half received a set of control 
instructions). Participants responded in-line with our expectations. During the pre-instructions 
IRAP they endorsed the belief that pleasant images are positive and disgusting images are 
negative while simultaneously rejecting the belief that pleasant images are negative and 
disgusting images are positive. During the post-instructions IRAP participants in the control 
condition continued to respond in a similar way. Critically, however, their counterparts in the 
faking condition successfully eliminated all traces of their beliefs in the second IRAP. Thus it 
seems that providing instructions to fake without highlighting a viable strategy to do so only 
allows participants to dismantle rather than reverse the direction of their IRAP effects.  
EXPERIMENT 3 
Whereas the previous two studies focused on automatic evaluations of a non-socially 
sensitive nature it seems reasonable to assume that motivation to strategically manipulate one’s 
performance may be relatively higher in socially sensitive situations. Indeed, indirect procedures 
are typically deployed under the assumption that motivations to bias one’s performance will 
ultimately meet with failure even in socially-sensitive contexts (although see Fiedler & Bluemke, 
2005). Demonstrating that IRAP effects can be strategically altered in such situations would 
provide even stronger evidence for the fakeability of the measure. Therefore in Experiment 3 we 
sought to replicate and extend our previous results into a third domain (implicit race 
evaluations). Half of the participants were provided with a similar set of ‘orientating’ faking 
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instructions as in Experiment 2 with the assumption that this would serve to eliminate (rather 
than reverse) their IRAP effects. The other half were given a detailed set of faking instructions 
which clearly stated how they could successfully manipulate the direction of their effects.  
Method 
Participants                                                                                                                                          
 Forty nine students at an Irish university completed the study in exchange for a candy 
bar. The majority of those who provided gender information (n = 40) self-identified as female 
(65%), while the total sample ranged in age from 18 to 52 (M = 25.33, SD = 9.13). The order of 
IRAP test blocks as well as assignment to the simple or detailed faking conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants. Students reported that they had completed between 0 and 15 
IRAPs prior to the study. It is worth noting, however, that median IRAP experience was 0.  
Measures 
IRAP stimuli. Eight label stimuli were used; four negative (‘Dangerous’, ‘Aggressive’, 
‘Rude’ and ‘Violent’) and four positive adjectives (‘Safe’, ‘Friendly’, ‘Polite’ and ‘Kind’), that 
were each presented twice during a block of IRAP trials. Eight color photographs of black 
individuals (four male and four female) as well as eight images of white individuals (four male 
and four female) were obtained from the CAL/PAL Face Database (Minear & Park, 2004) and 
served as target stimuli. The words “True” and “False” served as the two response options and 
the response rules were as follows: Rule A (“Please answer AS IF Black people are dangerous 
and White people are safe”) and Rule B (“Please answer AS IF White people are dangerous and 
Black people are safe”). This led to the following four trial-types: Black-Positive, Black-
Negative, White-Positive, and White-Negative. Finally, response options were varied in a quasi-
random order within each block. 
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Procedure  
Faking Instructions. The simple faking instructions were identical to those used in 
Experiment 2. The detailed faking instructions indicated that participants should respond quickly 
on certain blocks and slowly on others, while ensuring that they still met the overall 
latency/accuracy criteria (see Appendix B). In addition, a short message was provided before 
each block that reminded participants that they should respond either quickly (“**Note: please 
respond quickly**”) or slowly (“**Note: please respond slowly**”) during the subsequent block 
of trials. 
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 The analytic strategy adopted here was similar to that in Experiments 1-2.  
Data Preparation 
Participant exclusion. Five participants failed to pass both IRAPs while an additional 
participant failed the post-instructions IRAP. Data for these six participants was discarded prior 
to analysis. Of the remaining participants five in the simple “orientating” faking condition and 
four in the detailed faking condition failed to maintain accuracy criterion on one of the six test 
blocks. For these participants D scores were calculated based on the remaining two test block 
pairs. 
IRAP scoring. D scores for each of the four trial-types (Black-Positive, Black-Negative, 
White-Positive, and White-Negative) were calculated in a similar manner as Experiments 1-2. 
Positive scores indicate an endorsement of the belief that a racial group is positive or a rejection 
of the belief that they are negative. Negative scores indicate an endorsement of the belief that a 
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group is negative or a rejection of the belief that they are positive. Neutral scores indicate a lack 
of a racial bias. Change scores were also calculated as in Experiments 1-2. 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Pre- and Post-Instruction IRAPs. Based on previous findings (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, 
Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010) we expected participants to endorse the belief that 
White people and Black people are positive, and reject the belief that White people were 
negative (i.e., produce positive effects on the White-Positive, White-Negative, and Black-Positive 
trial-types). We also expected them to endorse the belief that Black people are negative (produce 
a negative effect on the Black-Negative trial-type). Submitting D scores to a 4 (Trial-Type) x 2 
(Test Time) x 2 (Instruction Type) mixed-models ANOVA revealed a main effect for Trial-Type, 
F(3, 41) = 25.69, p < .001, η2partial = .39, and Test Time, F(1, 41) = 4.05, p = .05, η
2
partial = .09, a 
two-way interaction between Trial-Type and Instruction, F(3, 41) = 21.22, p < .001, η2partial = .34, 
Trial-Type and Test Time, F(3, 41) = 53.32, p < .001, η2partial = .57, as well as a three-way 
interaction between Trial-Type, Test Time and Instruction Type, F(3, 41) = 31.75, p < .001, 
η2partial = .44. To qualify this three way interaction, the impact of Test Time and Trial-Type was 
examined separately for the simple and detailed faking conditions.  
With respect to the simple “orientating” faking condition, analyses revealed a marginally 
significant effect for Trial-Type, F(3, 19) = 2.53, p = .07, η2partial = .12, but no main or interaction 
effect for Test Time. During the pre-instructions IRAP participants were quicker to endorse the 
belief that White people were positive (White-Positive), t(19) = 4.12, p = .001, and that Black 
people were positive (Black-Positive), t(19) = 3.01, p = .007 (however they showed no effects on 
the White-Negative or Black Negative trial-types; both ps > .07). During the post-instructions 
IRAP, and similar to Experiment 2, participants showed no evidence for any effect with the 
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exception of the Black Positive trial-type, t(19) = 3.62, p = .002 (all other ps > .38). In contrast, 
the detailed faking condition showed evidence of a main effect for Trial-Type, F(3, 22) = 39.65, 
p < .001, η2partial = .64, as well as a two-way interaction between Trial-Type and Test Time, F(3, 
22) = 74.55, p < .001, η2partial = .77. When these participants completed the pre-instructions IRAP 
they strongly endorsed the belief that White people are positive (White-Positive), t(22) = 3.75, p 
= .001 (all other ps > .24). Yet when they completed the post-instructions IRAP they responded 
in-line with the faking instructions received. Specifically, they now endorsed the belief that 
White people were negative (White-Negative), t(22) = 6.89, p < .001, and rejected the belief that 
White people were positive (White-Positive), t(22) = 8.09, p < .001. They were also quicker to 
endorse the belief that Black people were positive (Black-Positive), t(22) = 9.68, p < .001, and 
reject the belief that Black people were negative (Black-Negative), t(22) = 6.89, p < .001 (see 
Table 3). 
 Change from Pre- to Post-Instruction IRAP. When changes scores were submitted to a 
2 (Instruction Type) x 4 (Trial-Type) repeated measures ANOVA a main effect for Trial-Type, 
F(3, 41) = 53.25, p < .001, η2partial = .57, as well as a two-way interaction between Trial-Type and 
Instruction Type was observed, F(3, 41) = 31.72, p < .001, η2partial = .44. For participants in the 
simple “orientating” faking condition the White-Positive trial-type effect diminished in 
magnitude across the two IRAPs (M = -.22, SD = .46), t(19) = 2.08, p = .05, whereas the White-
Negative (M = -.19, SD = .58), Black-Positive (M = .10, SD = .49) and Black-Negative (M = .07, 
SD = .57) effects did not differ from one test administration to the next (all ps > .16). In contrast, 
their counterparts in the detailed faking condition significantly reversed the direction of their 
IRAP effects in-line with the instructions provided. Specifically, they showed a reversed effect 
on the White-Positive (M = -1.33, SD = .77), t(22) = 8.29, p < .001, White-Negative (M = -.97, 
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SD = .58), t(22) = 8.01, p < .001, Black-Positive (M = 1.06, SD = .66), t(22) = 7.66, p < .001, and 
Black-Negative trial-types (M = 1.02, SD = .52), t(22) = 9.47, p < .001
4
.  
IRAP Reliability 
With respect to the pre-instruction IRAP, internal consistency for the four trial-types was 
as follows: White-Positive, r = .05, White-Negative, r = .66, Black-Positive, r = .04, and Black-
Negative, r = .18. Internal consistency of the post-instructions IRAP was as follows: White-
Positive, r = .91, White-Negative, r = .91, Black-Positive, r = .89, and Black-Negative, r = .83.  
Discussion            
 In Experiment 3 we provided half of the participants with faking instructions that 
orientated them towards those task properties which would allow them to generate a faking 
strategy for themselves. Similar to Experiment 2 we found that doing so helped people to 
eliminate rather than reverse the direction of their IRAP effects. The other half of the sample 
were provided with a concrete faking strategy which was then reiterated from block to block. 
This resulted in strong evidence for faking. During the pre-instructions IRAP participants 
strongly endorsed the belief that White people are positive and showed no other IRAP effects. 
Yet during the post-instructions IRAP they responded in precisely the opposite way: now 
endorsing the belief that White people are negative and that Black people are positive while 
simultaneously rejecting the belief that White people are positive and Black people are negative.  
EXPERIMENT 4 
In the previous experiment we provided participants with faking instructions that allowed 
them to manipulate their task performance in an effective but rather unsophisticated way. By 
informing them to speed up on certain blocks and slow down on others we provided a strategy 
                                               
4
 Given that participants varied in their prior IRAP experience we re-ran the above analyses while including that 
experience as a covariate. Results indicated that there was still significant main and interaction effects for, and 
between, test time and instruction type (even after IRAP experience was controlled for). 
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that influenced their performance on all four trial-types. However, a more convincing and 
difficult to detect form of manipulation would involve strategically altering performance on 
individual trial-types. This may play an important role in psychologically sensitive and applied 
domains. For instance, child sexual offenders might be motivated to alter their responses on 
Child-Sexual rather than Adult-Sexual trial-types when sexual preferences are being assessed 
(e.g., Dawson et al., 2009). Likewise, those looking to present themselves in an egalitarian light 
might attempt to manipulate their performance on the Black-Negative rather than White-Positive 
trial-types. Experiment 4 set out to determine if this subtle form of manipulation is actually 
possible in the context of implicit beliefs about sexuality. Specifically, we asked a group of male 
students who self-identified as homosexual to mimic how their heterosexual counterparts 
respond on the IRAP and vice-versa. In each case a refined set of instructions indicated how 
students could (a) reverse the direction of one trial-type effect, (b) attenuate the effect on a 
second trial-type, while (c) leaving the remaining two trial-types untouched. If participants can 
exert sophisticated control over their implicit sexual beliefs, then we would expect to see a 
reversed effect on one, an attenuated effect on another, and no change across repeated test 
administrations on the final two trial-types.   
Method 
Participants                                                                                                                                          
 Forty one male students at an Irish university were recruited on the basis of their self-
reported sexuality. Twenty participants, ranging in age from 18 to 51 years (M = 24.95, SD = 
9.24) self-identified as heterosexual while another twenty one, ranging from 18 to 34 years (M = 
20.95, SD = 3.34) self-identified as homosexual. Heterosexual men were operationally defined as 
those with a score between 1 and 3 on the Klein Sexual Orientation Grid (KSOG; Klein, 1993) 
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while homosexual men were defined as those with a score between 5 and 7 on that same scale. 
The order of IRAP test blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Students reported that 
they had completed between 0 to 6 IRAPs prior to the study. It is worth noting, however, that 
median IRAP experience was a single prior exposure.  
Measures 
IRAP stimuli. Ten label stimuli were used; five ‘sexually attractive’ terms (‘Arousing, 
‘Erotic’, ‘Attractive’, ‘Sensual’, and ‘Exciting’) and five ‘sexually unattractive’ terms (‘Awful’, 
‘Repulsive’, ‘Repelling’, ‘Repugnant’, and ‘Repellent’). Five color images of nude males (4460, 
4500, 4534, 4550, 4561) as well as five images of nude females (4141, 4142, 4210, 4240, 4332) 
were taken from the IAPS and served as target stimuli. The words “True” and “False” served as 
two response options while the following response rules were used: Rule A (“Please answer AS 
IF Women are attractive and Men are unattractive”) and Rule B (“Please answer AS IF Men are 
attractive and Women are unattractive”). This led to the following four trial-types: Men-
Attractive, Men-Unattractive, Women-Attractive, Women-Unattractive. Finally, the location of 
response options was fixed within each block of trials.  
 Klein Sexual Orientation Grid. The current study used the KSOG to gather information 
about seven different aspects of sexual orientation; ‘sexual attraction’, ‘sexual behavior’, ‘sexual 
fantasies’, ‘emotional preference’, ‘social preference’, ‘hetero/gay lifestyle’ and ‘self-
identification’. Participants are asked to respond to items from the first five dimensions using a 
scale ranging from 1 (other-sex only) to 7 (same-sex only), with a midpoint of 4 (both sexes 
equally). They were also asked to respond to items from the final two dimensions using a scale 
ranging from 1 (Heterosexual only) to 7 (Gay/Lesbian only) with a midpoint of 4 (Hetero/Gay-
Lesbian equally). Although responses are typically assessed across three different time periods 
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(past, present, and ideal) we only focused on a single temporal period (‘present’) given the 
methodological purposes of the current study.  
Procedure 
Faking Instructions. Participants were administered a detailed set of instructions which 
provided them with information on how to strategically alter their performance on specific IRAP 
trial-types. These instructions indicated that homosexual males should respond like their 
heterosexual counterparts and vice-versa. For instance, heterosexual participants were asked to 
“respond as if they found images of naked men attractive and naked women unattractive”. To 
help them do so, instructions prior to Rule A blocks indicated that they should respond slowly on 
the Men-Attractive and Women-Attractive trial-types whereas instructions before the Rule B 
block indicated that they should respond slowly during Women-Attractive and quickly during 
Men-Attractive trial-types. Note homosexual participants received a comparable but modified set 
of instructions that would enable them to respond as a heterosexual male presumably would (see 
Appendix B).  
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 The analytic strategy adopted here was similar to that in Experiments 1-3.  
Data Preparation 
Participant exclusion. Four participants failed both IRAPs while another six failed the 
post-instructions IRAP. Data for these ten participants were discarded prior to analysis. Of the 
remaining participants two students who self-identified as homosexual failed to maintain 
accuracy criterion on one of the six test blocks. Their D scores were calculated based on the 
remaining two test block pairs.  
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IRAP. D scores for each of the four trial-types (Men-Attractive, Men-Unattractive, 
Women-Attractive, Women-Unattractive) were calculated in a similar manner as Experiments 1-
3. Positive scores indicate an endorsement of the belief that a particular gender is attractive and a 
rejection of that gender as unattractive. Negative scores indicate an endorsement of the belief 
that a gender is unattractive and a rejection of the belief that they are attractive. Neutral scores 
indicate a lack of either response bias. Change scores were calculated as in Experiments 1-3. 
KSOG. The data from the ‘emotional preference’ and ‘social preference’ dimensions 
were not included given that they are thought to measure something other than sexual orientation 
(see Weinrich, Snyder, Pillard, Grant, Jacobson, Robinson, & McCutchan, 1993). Scores from 
the other five dimensions were averaged to create a single mean index of sexual orientation, with 
lower values (1-3) reflecting an overall preference for the other sex, higher values (5-7) an 
overall preference for the same sex while a score of 4 indicated a lack of preference for either 
sex. Submitting these scores to a one-way ANOVA produced a pattern of findings that were 
consistent with participants self-reported sexual orientation, F(1, 28) = 299.59, p < .001, η2partial = 
.92, with heterosexuals students scoring between 1 and 3 (M = 1.41, SD = 0.37) and homosexual 
students scoring between 5 and 7 (M = 5.9, SD = 0.93). Note that no participant obtained a score 
of 4.   
Hypothesis Testing  
Pre- and Post-Instruction IRAPs. Based on previous work on implicit beliefs about 
sexuality (e.g., Rönspies et al., 2015) we expected heterosexual students to endorse the belief 
that women are attractive and men are unattractive while rejecting the belief that women are 
unattractive and male are attractive (i.e., produce positive effects on the Women-Attractive and 
Women-Unattractive and negative effects on the Men-Attractive and Men-Unattractive trial-
 IRAP FAKING 32 
types). We expected a different pattern of responding for their homosexual counterparts. That is, 
they should endorse the belief that men are attractive and reject the belief that men are 
unattractive (i.e., produce positive effects on the Men-Attractive and Men-Unattractive trial-
types).  However, we did not expect them to produce any effects on the Women-Attractive and 
Women-Unattractive trial-types. 
Submitting data to a 4 (Trial-Type) x 2 (Sexuality) x 2 (Test Time) mixed-models 
ANOVA revealed a main effect for Trial-Type, F(3, 29) = 9.73, p < .001, η2partial = .25, and Test 
Time, F(1, 29) = 10.43, p = .003, η2partial = .27, a two-way interaction between Trial-Type and 
Sexuality, F(1, 29) = 4.93, p = .003, η2partial = .15, Trial-Type and Test Time, F(3, 29) = 4.45, p = 
.006, η2partial = .13, as well as a three-way interaction between Trial-Type, Test Time, and 
Sexuality, F(3, 29) = 40.29, p < .001, η2partial = .58. In order to specify this three way interaction, 
the impact of Trial-Type and Test Time were examined separately for heterosexual and 
homosexual students. 
With respect to heterosexual students, a main effect for Trial-Type was observed, F(3, 
14) = 5.29, p = .003, η2partial = .27, along with a two-way interaction between Trial-Type and Test 
Time, F(3, 14) = 16.46, p < .001, η2partial = .54. During the pre-instructions IRAP, heterosexual 
students endorsed the belief that women were sexually attractive (Women-Attractive), t(14) = 
6.59, p < .001, and rejected the belief that women were sexually unattractive (Women-
Unattractive), t(14) = 6.62, p < .001. However, they showed no effects on the Men-Attractive or 
Men-Unattractive trial-types (both ps > .07). During the post-instructions IRAP, heterosexual 
students displayed the expected pattern of faking effects: they attenuated their effect on the 
Women-Attractive trial-type, t(14) = 2.85, p = .013, showed no effect on the Women-Unattractive 
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or Men-Unattractive trial types (both ps > .08) and now showed a strong effect on the Men-
Attractive trial-type, t(14) = 3.66, p < .003, which was directly targeted in the faking instructions.  
 Submitting the data from the homosexual group to a similar set of analyses revealed a 
main effect for Trial-Type, F(3, 15) = 10.14, p < .001, η2partial = .40, Test Time, F(1, 14) = 14.11, 
p = .002, η2partial = .49, and a two-way interaction between Trial-Type and Test Time, F(3, 14) = 
29.29, p < .001, η2partial = .66. During the pre-instructions IRAP homosexual students endorsed 
the belief that men were sexually attractive (Men-Attractive, t(15) = , 9.92 p < .001) and that 
women were sexually unattractive (Women-Unattractive, t(15) = 2.22, p = .04). They were also 
quicker to reject the belief that men were sexually unattractive (Men-Unattractive), t(15) = 5.90, 
p < .001, but showed no effect on the Women-Attractive trial-type (p = .7). During the post-
instructions IRAP those same participants showed the expected pattern of faking effects: they 
attenuated their effect on the Men-Attractive trial-type, t(15) = 3.00, p = .01, showed no effect on 
the Male-Unattractive (p = .3) or Women-Unattractive trial-types (p = .06), and now showed a 
strong effect the Women-Attractive trial-type, t(15) = 9.11, p < .001, which was directly targeted 
by the faking instructions (see Table 4).
5
 
Changes from Pre- to Post Instructions IRAP. If our instructions were successful, then 
we would expect homosexual students to strongly endorse the belief that women were attractive 
(Woman-Attractive) and show a reduced belief that men were attractive (Men-Attractive). We 
would also expect heterosexual students to strongly endorse the belief that men are attractive 
(Men-Attractive) and show attenuated belief that women are attractive (Women-Attractive). To 
test this hypothesis, change scores were submitted to a 2 (Sexuality) x 4 (Trial-type) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Analyses revealed a main effect for Trial-type, F(3, 29) = 4.45, p = .006, 
                                               
5
 Note that in Experiments 1-4 we also averaged the D scores from the four IRAP trial-types to create a single 
overall D score. Submitting the overall D scores from the pre and post-instructions IRAPs to a similar set of 
statistical analyses as outlined above led to comparable findings as seen at the trial-type level.  
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η2partial = .13, as well as a two-way interaction between Trial-Type and Sexuality, F(3, 29) = 
40.29, p < .001, η2partial = .58. Consistent with our first prediction, homosexual students 
completely reversed the direction of their effect on the Women-Attractive trial-type (M = 1.21, 
SD = .53), unlike their heterosexual counterparts, who attenuated their effect across repeated test 
administrations (M = -.36, SD = .57). Consistent with our second prediction, heterosexual 
students reversed the direction of their Men-Attractive effect (M = .88, SD = .80), unlike their 
homosexual counterparts, whose attenuated their effect from one IRAP to the next (M = -.25, SD 
= .71). Unexpectedly, homosexual students also reversed their effect on the Women-Unattractive 
trial-type (M = .41, SD = .45), while heterosexual students showed an attenuated effect across the 
two IRAPs (M = -.29, SD = .59). Similarly, heterosexual students (M = .29, SD = .43) reversed 
the direction of their effect on the Men-Unattractive trial-type, unlike their homosexual 
counterparts, who showed an attenuated effect (M = -.29, SD = .36).
6
 
IRAP Reliability 
With respect to the pre-instruction IRAP, internal consistency for the four trial-types was 
as follows: Men-Attractive, r = .72, Men-Unattractive, r = .63, Women-Attractive, r = .63, and 
Women-Unattractive, r = .79. Internal consistency of the post-instructions IRAP was as follows: 
Men-Attractive, r = .87, Men-Unattractive, r = .43, Women-Attractive, r = .76, and Women-
Unattractive, r = .85.  
Discussion  
In Experiment 4 we sought to produce patterns of faking that would be difficult to detect 
in experimental settings. Specifically, we instructed participants how they could attenuate their 
effects on one trial-type, reverse their effects on a second, and show no change on the other two. 
                                               
6
 Similar to Experiment 3 we re-ran our analyses while including prior IRAP experience as a covariate. A 
comparable set of findings emerged even after IRAP experience was controlled for. 
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Our findings suggest that this outcome is possible. At baseline, homosexual students 
automatically endorsed the belief that men are sexually attractive and women are sexual 
unattractive (they also rejected the belief that men were sexually unattractive). Yet after 
receiving faking instructions, those same students attenuated their Men-Attractive effects and 
now responded to women as being sexually attractive. A similar set of outcomes were also 
obtained for their heterosexual counterparts. At baseline these students endorsed the belief that 
women are attractive, rejected the belief that women are unattractive, and showed no effect on 
either of the men related trial-types. Following faking instructions those same students attenuated 
their Women-Attractive effect and now responded to men as being sexually attractive. Therefore 
it seems that participants are capable of a subtle form of faking that involves exerting control 
over individual IRAP effects.   
General Discussion 
By systematically varying the nature of the instructions provided, and by generalizing our 
findings across a variety of domains, the current work reveals that IRAP effects, like those 
obtained from the IAT and priming, are not impervious to strategic manipulation. Consistent 
with McKenna et al. (2007) we found that merely informing participants to ‘fake’ their 
performance without providing a concrete strategy to do so did not eliminate, reverse, or in any 
way alter the obtained outcomes, even when participants had immediate prior experience with 
the task (Experiment 1). However, when instructions orientated attention towards the core 
parameters of the procedure, participants spontaneously derived a strategy that allowed them to 
eliminate, but not reverse, their IRAP effects (Experiment 2). Indeed, participants were only able 
to reverse the direction of their effects when they were provided with a specific response strategy 
that was continually reiterated throughout the task (Experiment 3). By refining the nature of the 
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instructions provided, we managed to produce subtle patterns of faking that would be difficult to 
identify in natural settings (Experiment 4). Taken together, it seems that IRAP performance can 
be strategically manipulated. However, the degree to which control can be exerted over one’s 
performance is contingent upon (a) the nuanced nature of that control (whether one is attempting 
to fake overall or trial-type effects) and (b) whether one is provided with a viable response 
strategy or has to devise such a strategy for themselves.     
Several issues are worth noting here. First, we recognize that the instructed faking 
strategies used in Experiments 3-4 are unlikely to be spontaneously devised by uninformed 
participants in natural settings. Indeed, in ecologically valid situations a sophisticated faking 
pattern would require participants to manipulate individual trial-types on the basis of their own 
self-generated response strategy. Drawing on the findings of Barnes-Holmes et al. (2010), for 
example, if participants wanted to conceal evidence of automatic racial bias, they would need to 
reverse their effect on a single trial-type (Black-Negative) while leaving the other three 
untouched. Yet based on Experiment 4, it seems that sophisticated levels of manipulation, while 
certainly possible, are among the most difficult to produce. In other words, the current paper was 
not concerned with the degree to which participants habitually exert control over their IRAP 
performance – simply whether such control is possible. 
Second, researchers continue to use indirect procedures like the IAT and evaluative 
priming despite their susceptibility to manipulation because they (a) capture automatic behaviors 
that often allude self-report procedures and (b) predict thoughts, feelings and actions across a 
wide variety of settings (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Demonstrating that 
the IRAP is also susceptible to control does not threaten its utility insofar as it also captures and 
predicts those same classes of behavior (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Vahey et al., 
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2015). Third, it appears that unlike the IAT and the AMP, participants were unable to 
spontaneously generate a strategy to alter their performance without direct intervention by the 
researcher, despite the fact that they had just completed an IRAP several minutes before 
(Experiment 1). Even when attention was drawn to aspects of their behavior that they should 
change in order to manipulate their effects (Experiment 2) the ensuing response strategy 
attenuated, rather than reversed the direction of those outcomes. Only when participants were 
equipped with detailed instructions and those instructions were constantly reiterated throughout 
the task was evidence of robust faking observed. Thus controlling the direction and magnitude of 
one’s IRAP effects seems to be relatively more difficult to achieve when compared to alternative 
indirect procedures. Critically, however, support for this claim necessitates future research in 
which the relative sensitivity to manipulation of IRAP, IAT, and AMP effects, and other newly 
introduced indirect procedures (e.g., DeHouwer et al., 2015; O’Shea, et al., 2015) are directly 
compared. Surprisingly, past work has tended to focus on the degree to which a single implicit 
measure can be faked, and in some instances, compared performances on indirect to direct 
procedures. Yet researchers have never compared the degree to which one implicit measure is 
more or less sensitive to faking than another, or compared their respective dependency on factors 
such as prior task experience or instructed response strategies. Systematic investigation of these 
factors could allow for indirect procedures to be arranged along a continuum from higher to 
lower controllability and provide researchers with a means to select between tasks when 
controllability is an issue (e.g., in applied or diagnostic settings).  
Open Questions and Future Directions 
Although our research sheds new light on the IRAP’s sensitivity to strategic manipulation 
several important questions still need to be addressed. We know very little about the contextual 
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conditions that either increase or decrease a person’s ability to strategically influence their 
performance. It may be that, just like the IAT, participants are better able to exert control over 
their behavior when they have previously encountered the task, are given repeated opportunities 
to manipulate their performance, or when they are exposed to multiple IRAPs in close temporal 
succession. For instance, in Experiments 1-4 participants always completed a baseline IRAP 
before receiving instructions to fake their performance on a second IRAP. It may be that the 
observed faking performances were – in part – contingent upon this prior experience with the 
task. It is also possible that fixing versus randomizing the location of the IRAP’s response 
options (or even the content of those response options) may influence the success of any faking 
attempt. For instance, when fixed response options are employed participants no longer need to 
‘track’ the changing location of a response, thus providing them with additional time to exert 
control over their task performance. Yet keeping response options in constant flux across trials 
may make it more difficult to meet the mastery criteria, and adhere to the response rule operating 
in that block of trials, while also attempting to manipulate one’s performance. Put simply, faking 
may be facilitated in the former and undermined in the latter situation. We should note that this 
property of the IRAP was varied in an unsystematic manner across studies insofar as fixed 
response locations were used in Experiments 1 and 4 whereas random locations were used in 
Experiments 2 and 3. Although we observed evidence of strategic manipulation across three of 
these four studies future work could systematically vary this property to determine its potential 
impact on faking success. The same goes for the manner in which target and label stimuli have to 
be related during each IRAP trial. It may be that increasing the complexity of the presented 
stimuli, or the ways in which they have to be related, decreases the likelihood of successful 
faking performances. For instance, participants in Experiment 1 had to relate stimuli as either 
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‘Similar’ or ‘Opposite’, whereas their counterparts in Experiments 2-4 had to relate stimuli using 
‘True’ and ‘False’. The impact of using different response options in this way currently remains 
unknown. Similarly, while we know that faking one IAT increases the probability of faking 
another (Röhner et al., 2011), the extent to which this is also true for the IRAP remains to be 
seen. When answering the above questions it will be important to control for other possible 
moderators, such as domain of interest (socially versus non-socially sensitive), its relevance to 
the individual, along with their current physiological and psychological state. Thus new studies 
are needed which systematically manipulate prior experience with the IRAP (both within and 
between experimental sessions) while accounting for the above factors. 
Another question concerns the degree to which people devise and utilize response 
strategies in natural settings. In other words, how likely is faking in everyday research using the 
IRAP? The ability to implement externally-conveyed faking instructions, while certainly 
informative, does not tell us whether people are capable of discovering and applying such 
strategies for themselves. Nor does it tell us what strategies they tend to devise. It may be that 
some participants alter their speed on ‘Rule A’ blocks, ‘Rule B’ blocks or both. In addition, by 
implementing the above strategies at the trial-type (rather than block level) participants could 
alter their outcomes in a manner that is difficult to detect and correct for. Therefore future 
research should identify those aspects of the procedure, participant, and context which increase 
the likelihood of self-initiated attempts to manipulate IRAP effects. For instance, motivation to 
fake could be manipulated by exposing participants to a mock interview with an internationally 
respected company and then informing them that their job would involve daily contact with a 
specific racial group (see Teige-Mocigemba et al., 2015 for such work with the AMP). 
Participants could also be informed that the mock hiring decision would be based on how they 
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answer a series of questionnaires as well as the IRAP. The hiring agent (a confederate) could 
“help” the participant by telling them that their chances of employment would increase if they 
“acted as if they liked the racial group on the IRAP”. Researchers could compare the extent to 
which this information leads to modified IRAP effects relative to a participant who is simply 
exposed to the IRAP on two separate occasions.  
Finally, past work has shown that it is possible to statistically detect and correct for 
successful manipulation attempts on the IAT. Yet no such efforts have been taken with regard to 
the IRAP. Future work could not only identify the environmental conditions that undermine the 
ability to control task performance but also assess whether fakers have a ‘signature’ response 
style which could be used to identify and control for their biased performances. Again, the 
relative ease of detecting faking could also be compared across different indirect procedures. 
When it comes to the IRAP two factors may serve as important diagnostic markers for those 
attempting to manipulate their effects. The first is the ability to maintain accuracy and latency 
criteria across successive blocks of trials. It may be that some participants can implement a 
faking strategy but that the parallel requirement to maintain a strict speed and accuracy criteria 
causes them to occasionally dip below these criteria from time to time. A second marker for 
faking attempts could be attrition rates. Experiments 3 and 4 provided the clearest evidence of 
faking and yet the highest number of participants who failed to pass the task. It may simply be 
too difficult for some participants to follow one response rule (i.e., “fake performance”), 
implement another (i.e., either “Rule A” or “Rule B”) while simultaneously meeting the IRAPs 
mastery criteria. This would explain why attrition levels increased in-line with the complexity of 
the faking instructions. Researchers could replicate the aforementioned studies while including a 
between-subjects control condition in order to determine if the observed attrition rates are a 
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function of repeated task completion or attempts to strategically edit one’s effects at increasing 
levels of complexity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IRAP FAKING 42 
References 
Agosta, S., Ghirardi, V., Zogmaister, C., Castiello, U., & Sartori, G. (2011). Detecting fakers of 
 the autobiographical IAT. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 299-306. 
Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., Stewart, I. & Boles, S. (2010). A sketch of the implicit 
 relational assessment procedure (IRAP) and the relational elaboration and coherence 
 (REC) model. The Psychological Record, 60, 527–542. 
Cvencek, D., Greenwald, A. G., Brown, A. S., Gray, N. S., & Snowden, R. J. (2010). Faking of 
 the Implicit Association Test is statistically detectable and partly correctable. Basic and 
 Applied Social Psychology, 32, 302–314. 
Dawson, D. L., Barnes-Holmes, D., Gresswell, D. M., Hart, A. J. P., & Gore, N. J. (2009). 
 Assessing the implicit beliefs of sexual offenders using the Implicit Relational  
 Assessment Procedure: A first study. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and  
 Treatment, 21, 57–75. 
De Houwer, J., Heider, N., Spruyt, A., Roets, A., & Hughes, S. (2015). The relational  
 responding task: Toward a new implicit measure of beliefs. Frontiers in Psychology, 6: 
 319. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00319. 
Fiedler, K., & Bluemke, M. (2005). Faking the IAT: Aided and unaided response control on the 
 implicit association tests. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27, 307–316. 
Gawronski, B., & De Houwer, J. (2014). Implicit measures in social and personality psychology. 
 In H. T. Reis, & C. M. Judd (Eds.), Handbook of research methods in social and  
 personality psychology (2nd edition, pp. 283-310). New York, NY: Cambridge  
 University Press. 
 IRAP FAKING 43 
Golijani-Moghaddam, N., Hart, A., & Dawson, D. (2013). The implicit relational assessment 
 procedure: emerging reliability and validity data. Journal of Contextual Behavioral 
 Science, 2, 105-119. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. K. (1998). Measuring individual  
 differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality 
 and Social Psychology, 74, 1464–1480. 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the Implicit 
 Association Test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 85, 197–216. 
Greenwald, A. G., Poehlman, T. A., Uhlmann, E., & Banaji, M. R. (2009). Understanding and 
 using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 17–41. 
Holtgraves, T. (2004). Social desirability and self-reports: Testing models of socially desirable 
 responding. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30, 161–172. 
Hughes, S., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2013). A Functional Approach to the study of implicit  
 cognition: The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and the Relational 
 Elaboration and Coherence (REC) model. In Dymond, S & Roche, B. (Eds.). Advances 
 in Relational Frame Theory & Contextual Behavioral Science: Research & Application. 
  Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications. 
Kim, D. (2003). Voluntary controllability of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Social  
 Psychology Quarterly, 66, 83–96. 
Klein, F. (1993). The bisexual option. New York: Haworth Press. 
 IRAP FAKING 44 
Lang, P.J., Bradley, M.M., & Cuthbert, B.N. (2008). International affective picture system 
 (IAPS): Affective ratings of pictures and instruction manual. Technical Report A-8. 
 University of Florida, Gainesville, FL. 
Langner, O., Ouwens, M., Muskens, M., Trumpf, J., Becker, E. S., & Rinck, M. (2010). Faking 
 on direct, indirect, and behavioural measures of spider fear: Can you get away with it? 
 Cognition and Emotion, 24, 549-558. 
McKenna, I. M., Barnes-Holmes, D., Barnes-Holmes, Y., & Stewart, I. (2007). Testing the fake
 -ability of the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP): The first study.  
 International Journal of Psychology and Psychological Therapy, 7, 253–268. 
Minear, M. & Park, D. C. (2004). A lifespan database of adult facial stimuli. Behavior Research 
 Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36, 630-633. 
Moors, A., De Houwer, J., Hermans, D., Wanmaker, S., van Schie, K., et al. (2013). Norms of 
 valence, arousal, dominance, and age of acquisition for 4,300 Dutch words. Behavior 
 Research Methods, 45, 169–177. 
Nicholson, E., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2012). Developing an implicit measure of disgust  
 propensity and disgust sensitivity: Examining the role of implicit disgust-propensity and  
 -sensitivity in OCD. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 43, 
 922-930. 
O'Shea, B., Watson, D. G. & Brown, G. D. A. (2015). Measuring implicit attitudes: A positive 
 framing bias flaw in the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). Psychological 
 Assessment. Available on-line at http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pas0000172  
 IRAP FAKING 45 
Payne, B. K., Cheng, S. M., Goverun, O., & Stewart, B. D. (2005). An inkblot for attitudes: 
 Affect misattribution as implicit measurement. Journal of Personality and Social  
 Psychology, 89, 277–293. 
Remue, J., De Houwer, J., Barnes-Holmes, D., Vanderhasselt, M.-A., & De Raedt, R. (2013). 
 Self-esteem revisited: Performance on the implicit relational assessment procedure as a 
 measure of self- versus ideal self-related cognitions in dysphoria. Cognition & Emotion, 
  27, 1441-9. 
Roddy, S., Stewart, I., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2011). Facial reactions reveal that slim is good but 
 fat is not bad: Implicit and explicit measures of body size bias. European Journal of 
 Social Psychology, 41, 488-494. 
Röhner, J., Schröder-Abè, M., & Schütz, A. (2011). Exaggeration is harder than understatement, 
 but practice makes perfect! Faking success in the IAT. Experimental Psychology, 58, 
 464-472. 
Röhner, J., Schröder-Abé, M., & Schütz, A. (2013). What do fakers actually do to fake the IAT?  
 An investigation of faking strategies under different faking conditions. Journal of 
 Research in Personality, 47, 330-338. 
Steffens, M. C. (2004). Is the Implicit Association Test immune to faking? Experimental  
 Psychology, 51, 165–179. 
Stieger, S., Göritz, A. S., Hergovich, A., & Voracek, M., (2011). Intentional faking of the Single 
 Category Implicit Association Test and the Implicit Association Test. Psychological 
 Reports, 109, 219-230. 
 IRAP FAKING 46 
Teige-Mocigemba, S., Penzl, B., Becker, M., Henn, L., Klauer, K. (2015). Controlling the 
 “Uncontrollable”: Faking Effects on the Affect Misattribution Procedure. Unpublished 
 manuscript. 
Teige-Mocigemba, S. & Klauer, K. C. (2013). On the controllability of evaluative-priming 
 effects: Some limits that are none. Cognition & Emotion, 27, 632-657. 
Uziel, L. (2010). Rethinking social desirability scales: From impression management to  
 interpersonally orientated self-control. Perspectives of Psychological Science, 5, 243
 –262. 
Verschuere, B., Prati, V., & De Houwer, J. (2009). Cheating the lie-detector: Faking the  
 autobiographical IAT. Psychological Science, 20, 410–413. 
Weinrich, J. D., Snyder, P. J., Pillard, R. C., Grant, I., Jacobson, D. L., Robinson, S. R., et al.  
 (1993). A factor analysis of the Klein Sexual Orientation Grid in two disparate samples.  
 Archives of Sexual Behavior, 22, 157–168. 
Wilson, T. D., & Dunn, E. W. (2004). Self-knowledge: Its limits, value, and potential for  
 improvement. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 493–518. 
Wittenbrink, B. (2007). Measuring attitudes through priming. In B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz 
 (Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes (pp. 17–58). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IRAP FAKING 47 
Appendix A  
Table 1 
 
Mean and standard deviation scores for the four IRAP trial-type effects as a function of 
instruction type (faking vs. control) and test time (pre- versus post-instructions). 
____________________________________________________________________________________                                          
        Faking Instruction         No Faking Instructions           Total  
                    ________________       ____________________        _____________ 
                          M        SD                           M        SD                 M        SD        
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-Instructions IRAP 
 
   Positive-Positive Trial Type                 0.64*    0.37                        0.60*     0.42                0.62*     0.39 
   Positive-Negative Trial Type               0.34*    0.42                         0.19*     0.39                   0.26*     0.41 
   Negative-Positive Trial Type              -0.26*    0.39                       -0.14       0.43                  -0.19*     0.42 
   Negative-Negative Trial Type       -0.21*    0.47                        0.03       0.46      -0.08       0.48 
 
Post-Instructions IRAP 
 
   Positive-Positive Trial Type                 0.51*    0.47          0.36*     0.35     0.43*      0.41              
   Positive-Negative Trial Type         0.25*    0.40          0.09       0.45                  0.17*      0.43 
   Negative-Positive Trial Type               0.10      0.49                       -0.01      0.41                  0.04        0.45 
   Negative-Negative Trial Type       -0.04      0.37                        0.09      0.39                  0.03        0.38 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * indicates that the corresponding IRAP effect differed significantly from zero (p < .05). 
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Table 2  
 
Mean and standard deviation scores for the four IRAP trial-type effects as a function of 
instruction type (faking vs. control) and test time (pre- versus post-instructions). 
______________________________________________________________________________                                          
             Faking Instruction      No Faking Instructions                 Total  
            ________________       ____________________        _____________ 
                     M        SD                          M        SD         M        SD        
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-Instructions IRAP 
 
   Pleasant-Positive Trial Type              0.41*     0.42              0.27*    0.42             0.34*     0.42 
   Pleasant-Negative Trial Type               0.39*     0.45             0.31*    0.38                       0.35*     0.41  
   Disgusting-Positive Trial Type                 -0.15       0.48                    -0.18*    0.38                     -0.17*     0.43     
   Disgusting-Negative Trial Type             -0.64*     0.33            -0.47*    0.41                     -0.55*     0.38 
 
Post-Instructions IRAP 
 
   Pleasant-Positive Trial Type             -0.10      0.68            0.31*     0.45                       0.12      0.59 
   Pleasant-Negative Trial Type              -0.07      0.62            0.25*     0.50                       0.10      0.58 
   Disgusting-Positive Trial Type                  0.31*    0.59           -0.03       0.30                       0.13      0.49 
   Disgusting-Negative Trial Type             -0.10      0.71           -0.56*     0.37                     -0.34*     0.59 
 
Note. * indicates that the corresponding IRAP effect differed significantly from zero (p < .05). 
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Table 3  
 
Mean and standard deviation scores for the four IRAP trial-type effects as a function of 
instruction type (simple vs. detailed faking) and test time (pre- versus post-instructions). 
_________________________________________________________________________________                                          
                Simple Faking           Detailed Faking                 Total  
            ________________       ____________________        _____________ 
                     M        SD                          M        SD         M        SD        
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-Instructions IRAP 
 
   White-Positive Trial Type              0.32*     0.35              0.35*      0.45            0.34*       0.40   
   White-Negative Trial Type               0.13       0.29             -0.00        0.33                   0.06         0.32 
   Black-Positive Trial Type                          0.19*     0.29              0.08        0.33            0.14*       0.32 
   Black-Negative Trial Type             -0.01       0.37             -0.03        0.35                  -0.02         0.35 
 
Post-Instructions IRAP 
 
   White-Positive Trial Type              0.10        0.51             -0.98*      0.58          -0.48*       0.77 
   White-Negative Trial Type              -0.06        0.55                    -0.97*      0.67                -0.55*        0.77 
   Black-Positive Trial Type                          0.29*      0.37              1.14*      0.57                  0.75*        0.64 
   Black-Negative Trial Type              0.06        0.48              0.98*      0.54                  0.55*        0.69 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. * indicates that the corresponding IRAP effect differed significantly from zero (p < .05). 
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Table 4  
 
Mean and standard deviation scores for the four IRAP trial-type effects as a function of sexuality 
(heterosexual vs. homosexual) and test time (pre- versus post-instructions). 
________________________________________________________________________________                                         
                Heterosexual            Homosexual              Total  
           ________________         _________________          ____________ 
                     M        SD                         M        SD                  M        SD                               
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Pre-Instructions IRAP 
 
   Women-Attractive Trial Type  0.73*     0.43   0.03           0.38         0.37*     0.54 
   Women-Unattractive Trial Type   0.55*     0.32              -0.15*         0.28          0.19*     0.46 
   Men-Attractive Trial Type                         -0.16       0.54  0.69*         0.28            0.28*     0.61     
   Men-Unattractive Trial Type              -0.16       0.32  0.39*         0.27             0.13      0.41 
 
Post-Instructions IRAP 
 
   Women-Attractive Trial Type  0.37*     0.50              1.23*        0.54                0.81*     0.67 
   Women-Unattractive Trial Type                0.25        0.51              0.25          0.49                0.25*     0.49 
   Men-Attractive Trial Type                          0.71*      0.75              0.45*        0.59                0.58*     0.68 
   Men-Unattractive Trial Type               0.13        0.37               0.10          0.39                0.12       0.38 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. * indicates that the corresponding IRAP effect differed significantly from zero (p < .05). 
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Appendix B  
Detailed Faking Instructions (Experiment 2) 
**To fake your responses on this task you need to do two things** First, try to respond slowly 
on those blocks that require you to respond as if “Black is Bad” and “White is Good”. For 
instance, when blocks ask you to respond to images of White people as “Good” and Black 
people as “Bad” please respond slowly. Second, try to respond quickly on those blocks that 
require you to respond as if “Black is Good” and “White is Bad”. For instance, when blocks ask 
you to respond to images of White people as “Bad” and images of Black people as “Good” 
please respond quickly. ** Note: You still have to respond within the speed and accuracy criteria 
that you encountered in the previous version of this task (i.e., try to avoid the red X and the !** 
You will be reminded before each block when to go quickly and when to go slowly. 
 
Detailed Faking Instructions – Heterosexual Condition (Experiment 3) 
**To fake your responses on this task you need to do two things** First, on the “women are 
attractive and men are unattractive” blocks, try to respond slowly on men attractive and women 
attractive trials but quickly on the other trials. Second, on the “men are attractive and women are 
unattractive” blocks, try to respond slowly on women attractive trials but quickly on the other 
trials.’ ** Note: You still have to respond within the speed and accuracy criteria that you 
encountered in the previous version of this task (i.e., try to avoid the red X and the !** You will 
be reminded before each block when to go quickly and when to go slowly. 
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Appendix C 
D-IRAP scores can be calculated in the following way: (1) discard response-latency data from 
practice blocks and only use test blocks data; (2) eliminate latencies above 10,000ms from the 
data set; (3) remove all data for a participant if he or she produces more than 10% of test-block 
trials with latencies less than 300ms; (4) compute 12 standard deviations for the four trial types: 
four from the response latencies from Test Blocks 1 and 2, four from the latencies from Test 
Blocks 3 and 4, and four from Test Blocks 5 and 6; (5) calculate the mean latencies for the four 
trial types in each test block (resulting in 24 mean latencies in total); (6) calculate difference 
scores for each of the four trial types for each pair of test blocks by subtracting the mean 
latency of the Rule A block from the mean latency of the corresponding Rule B block; (7) divide 
each difference score by its corresponding standard deviation (see step 4). This yields 12 D-IRAP 
scores, one score for each trial-type for each pair of test blocks. Finally, (8) calculate four overall 
trial-type scores by averaging the scores for each trial-type across the three pairs of test blocks. 
Note that these four trial-type scores can be collapsed into an overall D-IRAP score if the 
researcher so choses. 
